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W THE SUPREME COURT
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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN,

]

Petitioner/Appellant,
In Propria Persona;

]\
])

vs.

;

GARY DELAND, DIRECTOR, UTAH
STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et a l . ,

])
]
]

Respondents/Appellees.

SECOND M E N D E D
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Civil Case N o . 860272

]

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES NOW the Petitioner/Appellant, In Propria Persona, and respectfully moves the above entitled Court to grant the addition of the
Petitioner/Appellant f s Amended Supplemental Brief, filed herein, pursuant to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. That an appeal was filed by the Petitioner/Appellant in the
above entitled Court on October 3 0 , 1986.
2. That the above named Petitioner/Appellant entered a plea of
guilty before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, and w a s subsequently sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a minimum mandatory term of 10 years
to life imprisonment.
3. In a decision by the Utah State Supreme Court dated on June
3 0 , 1987, in State v. Gibbons, Case N o . 860405, Associate Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart wrote for the unanimous Court:

FILED
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I
"On this appeal, Gibbons claims his guilty plea was entered in
violation of Utah Code ANN § 77-35-11 (1982 & Supp. 1986) and his constitutional right to due process under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969) . . ."
II
"Because our remand of the case will call in question before the
trial court the validity of defendant's pleas under Boykin v. Alabama,
supra, and Rule 11(e) of our rules, a statement of law concerning the
taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in this state is appropriate.

/Rule 11(e)(1 thru 6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

§ 77-35-11, then quoted (SEE ATTACHMENT)/
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered.

The basis for that duty is found in Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969), where the United States Supreme
Court stated: 'What is at stake for an accused facing (punishment) demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding
of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.'
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Court stated
that 'clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it
constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the
charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process'.
329, 334 (1941).

Id. at 645 (quoting Smith v. 0'Grady, 312 U.S.

Futhermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the

2

defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the
relationship of the law to the facts.

In McCarthy v. United States,

394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme Court, in construing Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 stated that the factual elements
of the charges against the defendant must be explained in the taking
of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those
elements:
(B)ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless
the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation
to the facts
The Judge must determine 'that the conduct which the
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the
defendant has pleaded guilty1
There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the
record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him.
Id. at 466, 467, 470 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted, emphasis
in the original).

3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 at the time McCarthy was decided stated:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the
consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse
to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a plea
or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge
and the consequence of the plea. If a court defendant
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The Court
shall not enter a judgement upon a plea of guilty unless
it is satisfied that there is factual basis for the plea.
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Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements for taking
a guilty plea by using a written affidavit.

However, the affidavits

are not uniform throughout Utah,4 and trial judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their clients of the contents of the affidavit.

In a concurring opinion in Henderson, 426 U.S.

637, Justice

White wrote:
(I)t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to
be entered against a defendant solely on the consent of the
defendant's agent—his lawyer.

Our cases make absolutely

clear that the choice to plead guilty must be the defendant's:
it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his
plea and what it is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, (1969); and it is on his admission that
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest.
Id. at 650.
anc

Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e)

* Boykin, the law places the burden of establishing compliance with

those requirements on the trial judge.

It is not sufficient to assume

that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand
the contents of the affidavit.

4. Indeed, the form included in the record in this case is inadequate,
being nothing more than a form with boxes for the trial judge to check
denoting 'The defendant acknowledges receiving a copy of the information
and the same was read to him' (in this case the information was not read);
'Defendant is advised of his/her rights; and 'Plea is determined to be
voluntary. '
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, but an
affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the
pleading process.

A sufficient affidavit is one which is signed by

the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge and
which lists the names and degrees of the crimes charged.
4

The affidavit

should contain both a statement of the elements of the offenses and
a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish the elements of the
crimes charged.

The affidavit should clearly state the allowable

punishment for the crimes charged and should not that multiple punishments for multiple crimes may be imposed consecutively.

The aff-

idavit should list individually and specifically the rights waived
by the entry of the guilty plea*

The details of any plea bargain

should be set forth in the affidavit, as well as a disclaimer concerning any sentencing recommendations as required by Rule 11(e).
Finally, the affidavit should disclose the defendant's ability to
read and understand the English language, the absence of promises
to induce the plea, and the defendant's competency.

The trial judge

.should then review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant,
question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by i 77-35-11 on the record
before accepting the guilty plea.

If a court does not use an aff-

idavit, the requirements set forth above and in § 77-35-11 must still
be followed-^and be on the record.
This procedure may take additional time, but constitutional
rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy.

The

procedure outlined is designed to assist trial judges in making the
constitutionally required determination that the defendant's plea
is truly knowing and voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at
least facilitate swift disposition of, post-conviction attacks on
the validity of guilty pleas because the trial judge will have produced a clearly adequate rrcord for review.
We retain jurisdiction but remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
5

WE CONCUR:

Gordon Hall, Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice

A copy of State v. Gibbons, Case No. 860405, June 30, 1987,
Utah Supreme Court decision is also attached hereto for this Court's
consideration.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, in conclusion of the facts as stated above in the
Amended Supplemental Brief, the Petitioner/Appellant above named
seeks the additional relief from the above entitled Court and pursuant
to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Appellate Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED on this l^tL

d a y of J u l y j 1 9 8 7 .

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

N ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c e ^ / 7 . tCCg^-^
FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN
Petitioner/Appellant
In Propria Persona
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Fredrick George Olsen, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Second Amended Supplemental Brief of Appellant will
be delivered to the Attorney General's Office at 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, this /£yt*<- day of July,

1987.

FREDRICK GEORGE OLSEN, APPELLANT

Delivered by
day of July, 1987.

^/TXlL^lAJ^tL,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Bruce Gibbons,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 860405
F I L E D
June 30, 1987

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

First District, Cache County
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
Attorneys:

David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Respondent
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Appellant

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendant Bruce Gibbons appeals from convictions on
two counts of sexual abuse of a child, second degree felonies,
and one count of sodomy on a child, a first degree felony.
Gibbons contends that the trial court failed to determine if
the guilty plea he entered was made knowingly and voluntarily.
Gibbons also challenges the constitutionality of the minimum
mandatory sentencing scheme set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201 (1987). Because of the incompleteness of the
procedure in the trial court, we remand for further proceedings, but otherwise retain jurisdiction of the case for future
action that may become necessary.
After being charged with the crimes enumerated above
and after waiving a preliminary hearing, Gibbons appeared with
counsel for arraignment in district court and pleaded guilty as
charged to all counts. The following exchange occurred at the
arraignment:
The Court: State vs. Gibbons. Bruce
Gibbons; is that your correct name?
The Defendant':
The Court:
Mr. Hult:

Yes, sir.

Mr. Hult is your attorney?
Yes, your Honor.

The Court: And have you received a copy
of the information?
Mr. Hult:

We have.

The Court: This is an information that
alleges three counts. Count One sexual
abuse of a child, a second degree felony,
in Cache County, State of Utah, on or
about January through June, 1985; Count
two, sodomy on a child, a first degree
felony, in Cache County, State of Utah, on
or about June through September, 1985; and
Count Three, sexual abuse of a child, in
Cache County, a second degree felony, on
or about March 8, 1986.
As to those three counts have you made a
determination as to your plea?
Mr. Hult: Your Honor, there have been
plea negotiations with regards to this.
The negotiations consist of an agreement
that no additional counts would be added
and that the counts presently charged
would not be upgraded in light of any
additional information, and also an
agreement that an undertaking of bail
which we're filing with the court today
would not be opposed. • . .

The Court: [A]s to the information that I
just read to you, as to those three
counts, what is your plea?
The Defendant: On all three counts it
would be guilty.
The district court judge then informed Gibbons of the
penalties for each offense, advised him that the sentences
could run consecutively or concurrently, and informed him of
the rights that would be waived by the entry of a guilty plea,
but did not inform him of the elements of the crimes charged.
The following exchange then took place:
The Court: I also have to determine if
it's voluntary. Have there been any
threats made against you that would induce
you to plead guilty?
The Defendant:

No. 860405

No threats.

The Court: Have there been any promises
as to what sentence [you would receive]
from this court that would induce you to
plead guilty?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Are you doing this then of
your own volition?
The Defendant:
The Court:

Yes, sir.

Your decision?

The Defendant: My own decision.
The Court: And this is after you've
discussed it with your attorney?
The Defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: And after you've heard what I
told you about your rights and the
* possible consequences?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay, I'll accept it as a
Voluntary plea. . . .
On the basis of defendant's guilty pleas, and after a
sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Gibbons to two terms
of from one to fifteen years and one term having a minimum
mandatory of fifteen years and a maximum of life. The trial
judge ordered that the terms were to run consecutively.
Gibbons has not moved to withdraw his guilty plea in
the trial court; however, a timely notice of appeal was filed,
and sometime thereafter, appellate counsel was substituted for
Gibbons' trial counsel.
I.
On this appeal, Gibbons claims his guilty plea was
entered in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1982 &
Supp. 1986) and his constitutional right to due process under
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Because of unusual
circumstances, including the changing of defense counsel
during the pendency of the appeal, no motion to withdraw the
guilty plea was ever filed in the trial court, and ordinarily,
this Court will not entertain an issue first raised on appeal
in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain error.
State v, Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v.
3
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Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). The State argues
that we should decline to consider the guilty plea issue
because it was not raised below. However, the statutory
provision governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea, § 77-13-6
(1982), sets no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw the
plea.^ A motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, if successful,
would render the appeal of the guilty pleas in this case moot;
if the motion were unsuccessful, an appeal could then be
taken, resulting in two appeals in the same case. To avoid
this possibility and to eliminate the possibility of appeals
from two different judgments in the same criminal case, we
remand the case to enable defendant to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas, and we also retain jurisdiction
over*the case for any necessary future action.^ See generally
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). This disposition
is also consonant with the policy of allowing trial judges to
have the opportunity to address an alleged error. See State
v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983).
II.
Because our remand of the case will call in question
before the trial court the validity of defendant's pleas under
Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and Rule 11(e) of our rules, a
statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in
all trial courts in this state is appropriate.
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
§ 77-35-11, states in pertinent part:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty or no contest and shall not
accept such a plea until the court has
made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has
knowingly waived his right to counsel
and does not desire counsel;
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) states: "A plea of not
guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A
plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of court."
2. Should defendant wish to pursue the appeal after the lower
court proceedings, a new notice of appeal need not be filed.
Defendant instead should notify this Court and supplement the
record as required, and a new briefing schedule will be issued
by the Clerk of the Court, if necessary. Our retention of
jurisdiction also means that defendant's other issue
concerning the constitutionality of the minimum mandatory
sentencing scheme remains viable if it is not rendered moot by
the new proceedings.
No. 860405
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(2) That the plea is voluntarily
made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory
self-incrimination, to a jury trial
and to confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against him,
and that by entering the plea he
waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each
of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence that may
be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a
result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(fe) requirements
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis
for that duty is found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243-44 (1969), where the United States Supreme Court stated:
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands
the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a
full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence."
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the
Court stated that "clearly the plea could not be voluntary in
the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he
committed the offense unless the defendant received 'real
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first
and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'"
Id, at 645 (quoting Smith v. 0'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334
(1941)). Furthermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the
defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged
and the relationship of the law to the facts. In McCarthy v.
5

No. 860405

United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme Court, in
construing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,3 stated that the factual elements of the charges
against the defendant must be explained in the taking of a
guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those
elements:
[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of
all of the elements of a formal criminal
charge, it cannot be truly voluntary
unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to
the facts. . . .
. . . The judge must determine "'that
the conduct which the defendant admits
constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense
included therein to which the defendant
has pleaded guilty." . . . .

. . . There is no adequate substitute
for demonstrating in the record at the
time the plea is entered the defendant's
understanding of the nature of the charge
against him.
Id. at 466, 467, 470 (citations omitted, footnotes omitted,
emphasis in the original).
3. Fed. R. Crira. P. 11 at the time McCarthy was decided
stated:
A defendant may plead not guilty#
guilty or, with the consent of the court,
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such plea or a plea of nolo
contendere without first addressing the
defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to acdept a plea of guilty or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the
court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
The court shall not enter a judgment upon
a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the
plea.
No. 860405
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Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements
for taking a guilty plea by using a written affidavit.
However, the affidavits are not uniform throughout Utah,4 and
trial judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their
clients of the contents of the affidavit* In a concurring
opinion in Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, Justice White wrote:
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a
guilty plea to be entered against a
defendant solely on the consent of the
defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our cases
make absolutely clear that the choice to
plead guilty must be the defendant's: it
is he who must be informed of the
consequences of his plea and what it is
that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, (1969); and it is
on his admission that he is in fact guilty
that his conviction will rest.
Id. at 650. Because of the importance of compliance with
Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the law places the burden of
establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial
judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys
make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of
the affidavit.
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the starting
point, not an end point, in the pleading process. A
sufficient affidavit is one which is signed by the defendant,
his attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge and which
lists the names and the degrees of the crimes charged. The
affidavit should contain both a statement of the elements of
the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that
establish the elements of the crimes charged. The affidavit
should clearly state the allowable punishment for the crimes
charged and should note that multiple punishments for multiple
crimes may be imposed consecutively. The affidavit should
list individually and specifically the rights waived by the
entry of the guilty plea. The details of any plea bargain
should be set forth in the affidavit, as well as a disclaimer
concerning any sentencing recommendations as required by
Rule 11(e).^ Finally, the affidavit should disclose the
4. Indeed, the form included in the record in this case is
inadequate, being nothing more than a form with boxes for the
trial judge to check denoting "The defendant acknowledges
receiving a copy of the information and the same was read to
him" (in this case, the information was not read); "Defendant
is advised of his/her rights"; and "Plea is determined to be
voluntary."
5. The final portion of Rule 11(e) provides:
(continued on p. 8)
7
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defendant's ability to read and understand the English
language, the absence of promises to induce the plea, and the
defendant's competency. The trial judge should then review
the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question
the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill
the other requirements imposed by § 77-35-11 on the record
before accepting the guilty plea. If a court does not use an
affidavit, the requirements set forth above and in § 77-35-11
must still be followed and be on the record.
This procedure may take additional time, but
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of
judicial economy. The procedure outlined is designed to
assist trial judges in making the constitutionally required
determination that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and
voluntary and will tend to discourage, or at least facilitate
swift disposition of, post-conviction attacks on the validity
of'guilty pleas because the trial judge will have produced a
clearly adequate record for review.
We retain jurisdiction but remand for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result.

(footnote 5 continued)
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a
plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the same shall
be approved by the court. If recommendations as to .sentence are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
No. 860405
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